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I. Introduction
On June 14, 2012, two African-American males filed a putative class
action against ABC, the television network that broadcasts The Bachelor
and The Bachelorette.' As one legal blog quipped, the reality television
shows have been "spawning more litigation than marriages." 2  The
plaintiffs alleged that ABC deliberately excluded people of color from the
lead role on the shows. 3 Over the shows' ten-year history since 2002, they
had not featured a single person of color in the lead role, and a few people
of color who participated on the shows as suitors were eliminated early.
ABC and its co-defendants were sought to dismiss the suit on the basis that
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution protected their
casting decisions.s
In October 2012, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.6
Although no court had ever applied the First Amendment to protect casting
decisions, the court concluded that casting decisions warranted First
Amendment protection because such decisions are "part and parcel of the
creative process behind a television program."7  In April 2013, the court
denied the plaintiffs' request to file their second amended complaint, which
sought to include employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").8 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs had been well aware of the basic facts supporting their Title VII
claims before they initiated the lawsuit, but held those claims "in their back
1. See generally First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages at 2-3, Claybrooks
v. ABC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (No. 3:12-cv-00388) 2012 WL 2417312, ECF
No. 34 [hereinafter Claybrooks Complaint].
2. Bruce Carton, ABC's 'The Bachelor' Spawning More Litigation Than Marriages,
LAW.COM LEGAL BLOG WATCH (June 5, 2012), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legalblog
watch/2012/06/abc-the-bachelor-spawning-more-litigation-than-marriages.html.
3. Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1, at 2-3, 8-9.
4. Carton, supra note 2. In 2003, ABC began airing "The Bachelorette as a spin-off of The
Bachelor." Claybrooks v. ABC, 898 F. Supp. 986, 989 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). These shows are
"essentially identical," with one difference that "the gender roles are reversed-a woman
occupies the lead role and approximately 25 men compete to be the winner." Id. By the time the
court decided Claybrooks in October 2012, ABC had aired a total of twenty-four combined
seasons of The Bachelor and The Bachelorette, and had only featured white Bachelors and
Bachelorettes. Id. and n.4. According to a news article, the defendants had cast almost
exclusively white participants because they had feared that "potential controversy stemming from
interracial romance ... would alienate the Shows' predominantly white viewership." Id.
5. Carton, supra note 2.
6. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
7. Id. at 993. "The First Amendment protects a variety of artistic forms of expression,
including entertainment, television programs, and dramatic works." Id. (citation omitted).
8. Claybrooks v. ABC, No. 3:12-cv-00388, 2013 WL 1435050, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 9,
2013).
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pocket until the court decided the Motion to Dismiss."9 Plaintiffs have not
appealed the decision of the district court. Consequently, whether they
could have successfully litigated their Title VII claims remains an open
question.10
This note evaluates the circumstances under which the law should
protect non-actors applying for reality television as "applicants for
employment"" within the meaning of federal and state employment
discrimination laws. This note will argue that the casting process is the
functional equivalent of a job screening process; thus, reality television
applicants should receive the same legal protections as any other job
applicants. 12 The note will also argue that the law should not allow the free
speech rights to diminish employment rights and civil rights when the
speech in question encourages unlawful discrimination. Part II of this note
will provide the background of reality television and discriminatory casting
in the entertainment industry, and explain the current legal landscape in this
area. Part III will explore potential claims that a plaintiff can bring under
the federal and state antidiscrimination laws, their viability, and potential
challenges that the plaintiff will face in the course of litigation. Part IV
will propose alternative solutions to minimize discriminatory casting
decisions in reality television, arguing that network producers will likely
face a flurry of discrimination lawsuits in the near future. Part V will
conclude by recommending that litigants should explore employment
discrimination claims and other available legal remedies to settle the law
concerning discriminatory casting.
II. Background
A. Reality Television
Reality television has become extremely popular only in the last few
decades, 13 but its origins date back over sixty years ago with programs like
Candid Camera in 1948, Truth or Consequences and What's My Line in
9. Id. at *5.
10. Whether a worker is an employee is a threshold question in every employment
discrimination case, and if disputed, the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Atkins v. Computer
Sci. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 404, 408 (E.D. Va. 2003).
11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2014); see also,
e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (2014) (prohibiting
discrimination against a job applicant on the basis of protected categories).
12. This note, however, will only focus on federal and state antidiscrimination laws, and not
other types of employment laws, such as wage and hour laws.
13. Katie Hopkins, Unique Legal Considerations in Reality Television, 13 PGH. J. TECH. L.
& POL'Y 1, 4-5 (2012) (explaining the "real explosion" of reality television programs since
2000); see also Ryan Westerman, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 403, 406 (2013).
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1950, and I've Got a Secret in 1952.14 The reality programs we know
today gained popularity when writer strikes in the late 1980s left producers
to rely instead on unscripted reality shows featuring ordinary people. 5
Unscripted reality shows seek ordinary people to join the famous circle
usually enjoyed only by celebrities.1 6 As such, unscripted reality shows are
different from scripted shows featuring famous actors with significant
celebrity status, also known as "celebreality." 7
Television producers prefer unscripted reality shows because of their
relatively low budgets'8 and guaranteed success from real life drama that
resonates with viewers.' 9 Unscripted reality shows typically require "less-
talented actors or ordinary people," so their production costs tend to be
lower.2 0 Production companies save a large amount of money "because of
the cheap cost of labor that comes with hiring 'participants,' rather than
actors with significant celebrity status." 2 1 As reality television programs
gain more and more popularity, legal scholars anticipate that more
problems will arise from exploiting the benefits of reality television.22
Although discriminatory casting could cause many legal and social issues,
this note will only examine it through the perspective of equal rights under
the law.
B. Casting Processes
The underrepresentation of minorities in television, especially in lead
roles, has been an industry-wide problem since the television was invented
14. Charles B. Slocum, The Real History of Reality TV Or, How Allen Funt Won the Cold
War, WRITERS GUILD OF AM. WEST, http://www.wga.org/organizesub.aspx?id=1099 (last visited
Nov. 6, 2014).
15. See Hopkins, supra note 13, at 2 (detailing the history of reality television).
16. See Slocum, supra note 14 (explaining that talent search programs allowed the three
American Idol stars, Kelly Clarkson, Ruben Studdard, and Fantasia to join Britney Spears and
Justin Timberlake from Star Search).
17. Jennifer Ivy, A Critical Guide to: Reality Television, Sub-genres: Celebreality, http://
www.rtvfmediastudies.tcu.edu/Sub%20Genre%20Celebrity%2OShow.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2014).
18. See Slocum, supra note 14 ("In virtually every line of the production budget, reality-
based programming is cheaper than traditional programming.").
19. See id ("[R]eality TV has one appeal, which it shares with fiction-we as viewers
hope, desperately, to find something relevant to our own lives.... The possibility that reality-
based stories will reveal something real is so enticing that the televised society is just fine with
us.").
20. Hopkins, supra note 13, at 2.
21. Westerman, supra note 13, at 406.
22. Id. ("As more reality shows are produced, litigation involving such programs is on the
rise."); cf Hopkins, supra note 13, at 5-7 (discussing certain risks present in reality shows).
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in the 1920s.23 Historically, movie and television casting directors have a
very small role in decision-making, and a very small number of them
actually try to diversify the casting pool.24  Any person in the decision-
making chain, including studio executives, producers, directors, and casting
directors, can deny an applicant because of race or sex-based
considerations.2 5 Moreover, in the entertainment industry, the default racial
designation is white unless an exceptional situation calls for a non-white
actor.2 6
For traditional television programs, "[m]ost casting directors rely on a
company called Breakdown Services to parse a script into descriptions of
the characters and transmit these 'breakdowns' to talent agents." 27 The vast
majority of breakdowns specify race classifications for the roles, but this
information is concealed from the actors because breakdowns are released
only to talent agents.28 Thus, any discrimination involved in the casting
process is generally unknown to the public and concealed from excluded
applicants.29 Moreover, finding direct evidence of intentional
discrimination in the entertainment industry is extremely difficult-if not
impossible-because casting criteria are often highly subjective.30
Unlike traditional television programs, reality television programs
often use an open casting system and invite the public to audition for their
23. Sherri Burr, Television and Societal Effects: An Analysis of Media Images of African-
Americans in Historical Context, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 159, 159-60 (2001); see also 2007
& 2008 Casting Data Reports, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, available at http://www.sagaftra.org/files
/sag/documents/2007-2008_CastingDataReports.pdf (showing that non-Caucasian performers
made up 27.7% in 2006, 29.3% in 2007, and 27.5% in 2008 of all roles in movies and television,
and the 2007 number was the highest minority representation on record); Leonard M. Baynes,
White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by the Broadcast Networks in
Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 312 (2003) (explaining how the
lack of minority in television affects the availability of acting roles for actors of color).
24. Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007). One law professor has explained that
this reluctance to diversifying television stems from the fact that "network programming
decisions are based on economic considerations" and producers' belief that "[tihere's not enough
money in diversity to make it a priority." Burr, supra note 23, at 174.
25. Robinson, supra note 24 at 6-7.
26. Id. at 11 (quoting Interview with Reuben Cannon, former casting director and producer
ofDiary ofa Mad Black Woman, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 29, 2005)).
27. Id. at 9. Although Professor Robinson's article focuses on discrimination in
Hollywood's movie industry, Breakdown Services' casting system is not limited to movies. See
Who We Are, BREAKDOWN SERVs., https://breakdownservices.com/index.cfm/main/about (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014) ("Breakdowns that are released to talent representatives include episodics,
pilots, feature films, movies for television ... reality tv, and many other types of projects that
require acting talent.").
28. Robinson, supra note 24, at 9-10.
29. Id at 7.
30. Id. at 6-7.
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shows. 3 1 A typical open casting process solicits online applications
available through a show's website, including several photos and a short-
length video of the applicant to demonstrate his or her personality and
suitability for the show, phone interviews, and subsequent background
checks if selected as semifinalists and finalists.32 Additionally, producers
hold open casting calls at locations throughout the country, information of
which applicants can find on the Internet and television.33
Although announcements of such open casting calls do not typically
involve any sex, race or color classifications, they usually set application
criteria specifically tailored to the nature of the program. For example, The
Bachelor and The Bachelorette require that applicants be "single," 3 4
meaning they are not "involved in [a] committed intimate relationship,"
and free of past criminal record, including "a restraining order entered
against them." 35 Game shows like Survivor require that contestants be in
"excellent physical and mental health," so that they can cope with the
changing weather and environments during the filming of the show.36
Talent search shows like American Idol call for ordinary people's talent or
passion.37  Thus, none of these casting calls overtly discriminate against
minorities.
31. Id; Caitlin Cecil, Casting Reality TV, http://www.rtvfmnediastudies.tcu.edu/Casting.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (explaining that open casting calls invite "people from all over" to
visit the major U.S. cities where American Idol holds its initial casting calls); see also The
Bachelor Casting Calls, http://casting.bachelor.wamerbros.com/web/castingdisplay/cd.jsp (last
visited May 3, 2014) (posting open casting calls' locations and dates online to invite the public to
become the Bachelor for Season 19); Season 13 Audition Cities Announced!, AMERICAN IDOL
XIII (May 7, 2013), http://www.americanidol.com/news/season-13-audition-cities-announced
(posting open casting calls in seven major U.S. cities to invite the public "to become the next
superstar!").
32. Claybrooks v. ABC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); see, e.g., The
Bachelor Casting Calls, supra note 3 1.
33. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
34. The Bachelor and The Bachelorette Casting Eligibility Requirements, T 6, 10,
WARNERBROS.COM, available at http://casting.bachelor.wamerbros.com/web/eligibility.jsp (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014).
3 5. Id at T7.
36. Survivor Casting Call - Eligibility Requirements, HAWAII NEWS NOW, available at
http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/l 8629224/survivor-casting-call-requirements (last visited
Sept. 21, 2014).
37. See American Idol Season 13 Registration and Audition Rules 1, AMERICAN IDOL,
available at http://media.americanidol.com/season_13 auditions/ail3_Rules.pdf (last visited
Mar. 5, 2014) (requiring that an applicant not have, among others, "a contract for talent
representation," "current music recording contract," "current music publishing contract," or
"exclusive acting contract"); see also Top Chef Now Casting Season 12 FAQs, BRAVO,
http://www.topchefcasting.com/faqs ("If you have the passion and talent for cooking, you are
exactly who we're looking for! If you are a restaurateur, executive chef, chef de cuisine or sous
chef-you are encouraged to apply!") (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
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Discrimination in the selection process can, however, occur at any
stage of the process because online applications require photos and videos
of applicants. This requirement does not by itself violate Title VII, but
learning race or color (or any other protected categories) of an applicant
prior to an interview could "increase the risk of discrimination or the
appearance of the discrimination." Moreover, just like any other in-
person job screening process, a production company's employees can
screen applicants at a casting call location. For example, Claybrooks
plaintiffs alleged that white employees of the defendants treated the
plaintiffs differently than white applicants at their respective casting call
locations. 39 Those employees allegedly sent Mr. Johnson home, without an
interview, though they allowed white applicants to proceed to the interview
location.4 0 Mr. Claybrooks, who went to a different casting location, got to
the interview stage, but his interview was significantly shorter than the
average forty-five minutes afforded to white applicants. 4 1 Neither of them
heard back from the producers after they submitted their applications.42
C. Current Legal Landscape
Although the Claybrooks lawsuit was dismissed early, it certainly
confronted intentional discrimination and racial segregation in popular
television.43 It was the first case that challenged discriminatory casting in
reality television, and garnered a lot of publicity and attention from media,
provoking criticism from newspapers and webblogs nationwide.4 The
outcome of this case, however, left open the question whether similarly
38. TITLE VII / ADA: RECORDKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ELECTRONIC RESUMES
WITH VIDEO CLIPS / EMPLOYER KNOWLEDGE OF ETHNICITY, GENDER, AND DISABILITY PRIORTO
INIERVIEW, EEOC (Oct 5, 20041 available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2004/titlevii
ada recordkeeping_ video.html.
39. Claybrooks v. ABC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990-91 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
40. See Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91.
43. See Linda Holmes, A Judge Dismisses 'The Bachelor' Discrimination Lawsuit, But Not
Its Concerns, NPR (Oct. 16, 2012 7:33 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/monkeysee/2012
/10/16/162992776/a-judge-dismisses-the-bachelor-discrimination-lawsuit-but-not-its-concems
("[T]he fact that the lawsuit was dismissed doesn't necessarily mean that wasn't a useful
conversation to start.").
44. See Sarah Honeycutt, Comment: The Unbearable Whiteness of ABC: The First
Amendment, Diversity, and Reality Television in the Wake of Claybrooks v. ABC, 66 SMU L.
REV. 431, 443-44 (2013) (describing the comments and criticism The Bachelor had garnered
from the media all over the nation).
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discriminated plaintiffs could consider a Title VII claim as an alternative
to, or in addition to, an equal rights claim.45
Prior to Claybrooks, no one had directly challenged discriminatory
casting in the entertainment industry, perhaps because the industry is
largely "relationship-driven," and confronting discrimination could threaten
many actors' career.4 6  Moreover, the public, as well as reality show
applicants themselves, may not even consider the possibility that
participating in reality television shows is "employment."A7 On one hand,
if the law prohibited discriminatory casting in reality television, most
people would find such legal constraints quite "bizarre" because the idea
may be "wholly antithetical to the First Amendment.A8 On the other hand,
if no differences could distinguish the reality television casting process
from a typical job screening process, intentionally excluding people of
color from the lead role threatens equal employment rights.49
In the traditional television context, the Screen Actors Guild-American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("SAG-AFTRA")50 prohibits
unlawful discrimination against "its members and others employed under
its collective bargaining agreements." 5' Performers have two potential
ways to benefit from the union's policy against unlawful discrimination
and harassment. First, those who wish to join the union must submit proof
of employment for a position covered by a SAG-AFTRA collective
bargaining agreement, and pay the national initiation fee of $3,000.52
Second, performers who obtain a role on a television program registered
45. The Claybrooks Complaint only alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an equal rights
provision that prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts. See
generally Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1.
46. Robinson, supra note 24, at 5 n.12.
47. Cf Carley G. Mak, Note and Comment: Fame, Fortune, and... Fourteen-Hour Days?
Open Casting Calls for Reality TV Contestants Are Pre-Employment Tests and Public
Accommodations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523,
525 (2006) (arguing that contestants in talent search shows, such as American Idol and America's
Next Top Model, are essentially competing for "employment as recording artists and models,
respectively"). In comparison, contestants in The Bachelor and The Bachelorette are competing
for love and marriage, but such shows allow network producers to "create" celebrities and
presumably reap benefits from their talents and labor.
48. See Robinson supra note 24, at 1.
49. See id. at 2 (describing the problematic nature of sex and race preferences in casting
announcements when they are placed in the context of employment discrimination law, but not
"[w]hen viewed through the lens of artistic freedom").
50. SAG-AFTRA is a union representative to "more than 160,000 media professionals,"
who are "the faces and voices that entertain and inform America and the world." Union
Information, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/union-information (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
51. Discrimination & Harassment Policy, SAG-AFTRA, available at http://www.sagafira.
org/content/non-discrimination-policy (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (emphasis added).
52. Steps to Join, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/content/steps-join (last visited
Dec. 13, 2013).
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with SAG-AFTRA are protected under a collective bargaining agreement
that binds the network and producers. To hire union member actors, a
network must register a television program with the union.54 Nevertheless,
the current industry practices prevent non-actor applicants for a reality
program from joining the union or benefiting from a covered program.
Networks rarely register a reality program with SAG-AFTRA because they
do not have to hire union-member actors when they can easily find
"contestants" through open casting calls.55 Thus, even if a non-actor
applicant were able and willing to pay the required initiation fee and union
dues, the applicant would not likely secure a union job.
This dilemma is further complicated by the fact that non-actors, if cast
on a reality program, are labeled as "contestants" or "participants," 5 6 rather
than "employees." They are often considered "independent contractors,"
who are exempted from the protection of Title VII (or of any other
employment law).58  Taken together, the current industry practices leave
reality television "participants" squarely outside of any legal protection.
Pinpointing the wrongdoer is extremely difficult because nothing in this
context clearly violates the law unless these individuals qualify as
employees within the meaning of federal or state antidiscrimination laws.
The general lack of precedent on discrimination cases in the
entertainment industry59  is most likely a result of the robust First
53. See, e.g., 2011-2014 AFTRA National code of Fair Practice for Network Television
Broadcasting, at 103, SAG-AFTRA, available at http://www.sagaftra.org/files/sag/2011-
2014 aftranationalcode of fairpracticefornetworktelevisionbroadcasting.pdf ("Producer agrees
not to discriminate against any performer because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age,
sexual orientation, gender identity or disability, in accordance with applicable state and federal
law. In accordance with this policy, Producer shall cast performers belonging to all groups in all
types of roles . . . ." (emphasis added)) (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
54. SAG-AFTRA's No Contract/No Work and Rule One prohibits member actors from
working on a program not registered with the union. Global Rule One & No Contract/No Work,
SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/contracts/grl-no-contract-no-work (last visited Dec. 14,
2013).
55. See, e.g., Auditions & Open Casting Calls, BACKSTAGE, http://www.backstage.com/
casting/open-casting-calls/reality-tv/?page=1 (last visited May 8, 2014) (showing fifty-five of
seventy-five open casting calls for reality television are nonunion jobs and the rest of twenty are
both union and nonunion).
56. Westerman, supra note 13, at 406 (explaining that reality television producers save a
substantial amount of money by hiring "'participants,' rather than actors with significant celebrity
status").
57. Hopkins, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing that reality television producers hire actors or
contestants as "independent contractors" to avoid liability).
58. Alberty-Velez v. Corp. de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2004).
59. See Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 474 (2001)
(stating that as of 2001, no one had ever filed a lawsuit for discriminating against minority
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Amendment protection historically afforded to "creative" decision-making
processes such as casting. The United States judicial system favors First
Amendment protections over the competing constitutional interest of
equality in media.60  Moreover, research found only one employment
discrimination case against a reality television producer, which the parties
settled out of court.6 1
III. Application of Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights
Statutes to Reality Television Casting Decisions
Despite Title VII's explicit ban on racial preferences when making job
announcements, the current case law and statutory scheme virtually exempt
casting preferences from this ban. Discrimination plaintiffs can also
consider other federal or state civil rights statutes. One legal scholar
argued that "more challenges in different districts in order to get a full and
fair hearing in court, more publicity, and perhaps even a favorable verdict,"
are absolutely necessary to promote diversity in reality television.62 This
section will evaluate claims under four different statutory schemes that a
plaintiff can explore. It will also analyze potential legal challenges that a
plaintiff must overcome in order to successfully litigate discrimination
claims.
A. Claims
1. Race Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Federal and state employment discrimination laws ban discriminatory
hiring practices based on an applicant's race, among other protected
characteristics. Title VII, as well as many state statutes, provides
employees who have suffered such discrimination with a cause of action
actors); see also Robinson, supra note 24, at 2 & n. 5 (explaining that as of February 2007, the
author's research did not reveal a single published opinion in which a court adjudicated an actor's
Title VII claim based on race or sex); Megan Basham, Comment: Unmasking Tonto: Can Title
VII "Make It" in Hollywood?, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 549, 551 (2013) ("[D]iscriminatory casting
practices have been virtually unchallenged in the courts since the inception of Hollywood.").
60. See Robinson, supra note 24, at 2 (arguing that most big-budget films exclude women
and minorities or cast them in marginal roles "paying a mere fraction of the star's multi-millions,"
and that "the impact on equality should be apparent, yet the threat to artistic freedom remains
strong").
61. See, e.g., Eric Gardner, MTV Settles Lawsuit With 'Real World' Cast Member Who
Alleged Rape (Exclusive), HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.hollywood
reporter.com/thr-esq/real-world-rape-mtv-tanya-382809.
62. Honeycutt, supra note 44, at 446.
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against their discriminatory employers. 63  If a reality television applicant
believes he or she was denied an audition because of race (or any other
protected categories), the excluded applicant may file a claim under Title
VII,64 a state employment discrimination statute,65 or both.66
But not all employers are potential antidiscrimination defendants. For
an employer to even be subject to Title VII's antidiscrimination
requirements, it must have "fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 67  Major networks and
production companies likely meet this threshold, so the crux of a court's
analysis would depend on whether the plaintiff could qualify as an
employee of the purported employer.
Title VII defines an "employee" as "an individual employed by an
employer,"68  but, as the Supreme Court noted, this definition "is
63. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2014);
California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (2014); New
York Human Rights Law, NY. EXEC. § 296 (McKinney 2014).
64. Title VII prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person because of his or her race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l). Further, it prohibits an employer
from limiting or segregating "applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities. . . because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(2) (emphasis added).
65. For example, California's FEHA prohibits employment discrimination. See CAL. Gov.
CODE § 12940. The California Legislature intended to cast a broader net than Congress did
through Title VII, so the FEHA prohibits discrimination based on "race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, or sexual
orientation of any person." Id. § 12940(a). Nevertheless, when analyzing FEHA claims,
California courts follow the framework set by the United States Supreme Court under Title VII.
Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 56 Cal. App. 4th 138, 148 (1997); see also Beyda v. City
of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 4th 511, 517 (1998) (quoting Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
App. 4th 1409, 1416, fn. 5 (1993)) (noting the appropriateness of considering "federal cases
interpreting Title VII" because employment discrimination was "an area of emerging law" in
California). Similarly, New York's Human Rights Law prohibits employment discrimination that
prevents an individual from receiving "an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life."
NY EXEC. § 290 (McKinney 2014). Like California, New York follows the framework under
Title VII in analyzing employment discrimination. Helmes v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 137, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). Forty-six other states, except Alabama, and the District of
Columbia have laws that prohibit employment discrimination because of race. See Analysis of
State Law, 4 Emp. Discrim. Coordinator § 1:9 (WEST, Updated Sept. 2014). This note analyzes
racial discrimination in reality television according to the definitions and framework under Title
VII. It will, however, also introduce federal and California civil rights laws as alternative means
to bring suit when litigants cannot establish an employment relationship under Title VII. See
infra discussions at III.A.2 and III.A.3.
66. State laws often cover a broader range of protected categories. See, e.g., CAL. Gov.
CODE § 12940.
67. 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
1732015 WHITE MEN STILL DOMINATE REALITY TELEVISION
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
completely circular and explains nothing."6 9 Consequently, in determining
whether a plaintiff is an employee, courts evaluate whether the purported
employer has the right to control the plaintiffs employment
opportunities.7 0  Most networks and producers will deny that reality
television applicants are "applicants for employment."7 1 Thus, one of the
first challenges for a reality show applicant plaintiff is meeting the burden
of proving that had he or she been cast, an employment relationship would
have existed between the parties.72
In determining the existence of an employment relationship, courts
apply the common law agency test.73  In Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, the Supreme Court outlined the thirteen factors that
comprise the common law agency test:
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished[;] the skill required; the sources of
the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long
to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party. 74
69. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
70. See Diana v. Schlosser, 20 F. Supp. 2d 348, 352 (D. Conn. 1998) (concluding that an
employment relationship existed between a news reporter and a radio broadcasting company
because the latter had control over the reporter's employment opportunities); see also Alfred v.
Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (noting that "[c]ontrol
ofjob performance and employment opportunities" is "the most important factor" in determining
the existence of an employment relationship).
71. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(2). Whether the excluded applicant had "actual or prospective
employment relationship" with the producer is irrelevant to this analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from failing or refusing to hire any individual, "or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race" and other protected categories); see
also Diana, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 350-52 (listing a line of decisions that have concluded that an
employment relationship exists where the purported employer effectively controls the worker's
employment opportunities, even where the parties stipulate that they did not agree to an
employment relationship).
72. Deal v. State Farm Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1090 (5th Cir. 1990)).
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) ("[A]n employee is an
agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's
performance of work.").
74. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
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Courts place the greatest emphasis on the degree of control the
purported employer exercises over the details of the plaintiff s work, but no
one factor is dispositive. Thus, the courts evaluate the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship.
In Alberty- Velez v. Corporacion de P.R. Para La Difusion Publica, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff-actress was not an employee, even though the employer dictated
the manner, hours, and location of her work.76 Six factors other than the
control factor weighed against classifying her as an employee, and the
court concluded that she was an independent contractor.n The court
acknowledged that the degree of control exercise is "often critical to the
independent contractor/employee analysis," but that it "must be considered
in light of the work performed and the industry at issue."7 The court
reasoned that the tasks that the actress performed required her to follow
directions to achieve the director's goal of producing the program, and to
hold otherwise "would defy 'common sense' as it would result in
classifying all actors as employees, regardless of the other aspects of the
relationship."so The court also relied heavily on the high level of skill
required to do the plaintiff's work, which gave her the bargaining power to
choose between becoming an employee of a particular television station
and freelancing as an independent contractor.8' Thus, it was the actress
who "controlled the extent to which she wished to commit her professional
time to filming." 82
The working conditions involved with being a reality television
"participant" are different in many ways from those involved with a
professional actor or actress. Like the television station in Alberty-Velez,
the reality television producers control the details of the participants'
activities while filming a reality show. But unlike the professional acting
context, reality television producers control every aspect of the
participants' lives for the duration of the filming. The participants have
75. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992).
76. Alberty-Velez v. Corp. de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2004).
77. Id. at 7-8.
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Lerohl v. Friends of Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 491-92 (8th Cir. 2003)).
81. Id. at 9-10.
82. Alberty-Velez v. Corp. de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2004).
83. The degree of control is so extreme that it is inhumane. One former participant on The
Bachelor, who was one of twenty-five suitors for Season 17's Bachelor, stated in an interview
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very little control over what they should say;84 when they should be filmed,
i.e., when they should work;8 1 where they should work;86 and where they
should live. On the day the participants arrive at the Bachelor mansion,
the producers take the participants' phones and computers away.8 They
"are not allowed to speak to friends and family until [they] get home."89
Thus, unlike the working conditions of the professional actress in Alberty-
Velez, the controlled environment on The Bachelor and The Bachelorette
leaves the participants with no meaningful opportunity to devote time to, or
that producers constantly offer alcohol to get the participants "to be more talkative"; that "The
Bachelor cameras never stop rolling"; and that "the hardest part of filming the show is being
away from family, and having zero alone time." Anna Klassen, 'The Bachelor': Ex-Contestant
Leslie Hughes Spills Nine Secrets About the Show, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 10, 2013),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/10/the-bachelor-ex-contestant-leslie-hughes-spills-
nine-secrets-about-the-show.html. On the first night she arrived at the Bachelor mansion (where
the participants must live for the duration of filming), the filming began at 7 p.m. and did not
finish until 8 a.m. next day. Id.
84. See, e.g., Benardo v. American Idol Prods., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00625-CM, 2011 WL
2565489, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (stating that an American Idol applicant alleged in his
complaint that the producer's "employees asked him to 'gay it up' on camera," and that the
producer "actually conditioned [the plaintiff's] appearance on [Simon] Cowell's last show on his
willingness to act 'outrageous,' 'extra flamboyant,' and 'really gay' to the greatest extent
possible").
85. For example, the producer of The Bachelor and The Bachelorette requires that:
Each applicant acknowledges, understands and agrees that he or she, if chosen
as a bachelor or bachelorette on the Program, may be audio and/or video taped
twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week while participating in the
Program by means of open and hidden cameras, whether or not he or she is
then aware that he or she is being videotaped or recorded (collectively,
'Recordings') and that such Recordings may be disseminated on television
and/or all media now known or hereafter devised, in any and all manner
throughout the Universe in perpetuity.
The Bachelor and The Bachelorette Casting Eligibility Requirements, supra note 34, at I 10.
86. See id. at ¶ 20 ("Dates and/or location to be determined and subject to change in
Producer's sole discretion."); id at $ 21 ("Bachelor(s) and Bachelorette(s) must agree to live,
participate and cooperate with the other individuals and the Producer during the taping of the
Program."); id. ("Bachelor(s) and Bachelorette(s) must be able to travel for long periods of time,
must be adaptable to various living situations, and must enjoy participating and living in close
proximity with others of varied background and experience."); id. at ¶ 22 ("The Bachelor(s) and
The Bachelorette(s) must report and be available to participate in the Program at all times and
places as Producer shall designate.").
87. Id at 1 21; see also Survivor Casting Call, supra note 36 ("Our competitors must be
willing to commit to traveling and living in a remote location for approximately seven weeks.");
What It's Really Like To Be On the 'Bachelor': Your FAQ Answered!, THE ASHLEY'S REALITY
ROUNDUP (July 24, 2011), http://theashleysrealityroundup.com/2011/07/24/what-its-really-like-
to-be-on-the-bachelor-your-faq-answered/ [hereinafter The Bachelor FAQ Answered] (stating that
The Bachelor contestants "can not leave the house [the Bachelor mansion] ever").
88. Id
89. Id
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even to find, other employment or freelancing opportunities. They neither
hold skilled positions, nor do they have freedom to choose between
becoming an employee and freelancing in the entertainment industry.
Thus, as long as the producers continue to label them as "contestants," they
are freelancing without the option to become an employee.
Moreover, working on a reality television show often requires the
selected participants to leave their paying job, either by quitting or taking a
leave of absence, for the duration of filming.90 Selected individuals must
"be available to participate in the Program at all times and places as
Producer shall designate."91 For example, on February 28, 2014, Deputy
District Attorney Andi Dorfman of Fulton County, Georgia, reportedly left
her job during a murder trial so she could film the next season of The
92 hBachelorrette. Although her request was "highly unusual," her employer
was "willing to grant [her] request, albeit with certain caveats" that her
leave would be unpaid and that she would have until May 31, 2014, to
return to work.93
The courts should view the working conditions on a reality television
show as the functional equivalent of working all day for the producers. To
appear on a show, the participants must consent to the cameras recording
their activities twenty-four hours, seven days a week.94 Even though most
reality programs take anywhere from three months to six months to film,
thereby weighing against the duration of the parties' relationship factor,95
such a serious time commitment would leave the participants with no
meaningful opportunity to seek other employment or freelancing
opportunities.
90. See id ("Q: How are the contestants able to get off of work for so long to compete on
the show? A: . . . 'Many girls quit their jobs to come on the show."').
91. The Bachelor and The Bachelorette Eligibility Requirements, supra note 34, at 1 22
(emphasis added).
92. Andi Dorfman 'Bachelor': Bold sacrifice she is making to be 'The Bachelorette',
EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.examinercom/article/andi-dorfman-bachelor-bold-
sacrifice-she-is-making-to-be-the-bachelorette.
93. See Letter from Paul Howard, Jr., District Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FULTON CNTY.
DIST. ATT'Y (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://tmz.vo.lnwd.net/o28/newsdesk/tmz-documents
/0227-andi-dorfman-doc-01 .jpg.
94. The Bachelor and The Bachelorette Eligibility Requirements, supra note 34, 1 10; see
also Survivor Casting Call, supra note 36 ("Contestants will be filmed up to 24 hours a day by
television camera crews to be broadcast on national television."); see also Klassen, supra note 83
("The Bachelor cameras never stop rolling. 'They are on you all the time."').
95. Cf Alberty-Velez v. Corp. de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1, 10(1st
Cir. 2004) (discussing Dykes v. Depuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31, 34-36 (1st Cir. 1998) and Speen v.
Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 627 (1st Cir. 1996)) (concluding that Alberty's sixteen-
month relationship with the defendant did not impact the court's decision that she was an
independent contractor, similar to the court's decisions in Dykes (six-year relationship) and
Speen (twenty-year relationship)).
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Courts, however, will evaluate every aspect of the parties' relationship,
not just the control factor. The Alberty- Velez court, for example, found that
several other factors weighed in favor of classifying the actress as an
independent contractor.96 The plaintiff-actress provided her own tools and
instrumentalities to perform her work-"she provided, or obtained sponsors
to provide, the costumes, jewelry, and other image-related supplies and
services necessary for her appearance."97 The television station could not
assign the actress to tasks other than the tasks described in her contracts.9 8
She received a lump sum payment for each episode and did not get paid for
the work she did not perform.99 The television station did not provide the
actress with any fringe benefits, and she paid her own taxes.' 00 The court
did find that the actress was part of the television studio's regular business,
which was the only factor that weighed in favor of classifying her as an
employee.'0 '
Participants on The Bachelor and The Bachelorette initially bring their
own dresses and makeup for filming,' 02 but once they arrive at the mansion,
they end up receiving "a lot of cool clothes, shoes, luggage, and
sunglasses."o They also enjoy "various other benefits of participating ...
on either Show, including fully paid housing, food, and travel expenses." 04
The producers require that the participants live in the Bachelor mansion
while filming, and once they arrive there, they are "at the mercy of the
producers." 0 s They may not leave the mansion unless they travel to "new
cities and exotic locations" for filming.' 06 Even then, "sightseeing is pretty
much out of the question." 0 7 Thus, the participants provide some of their
own clothes and makeup, but the producers provide the essential tools and
instrumentalities for the participants to perform on the show, including
travel expenses, expenses associated with dating activities on the show, and
housing.
Some factors will weigh against finding non-actors on reality television
as employees. For example, they do not receive regular paychecks, fringe
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id.
98. Id at 8.
99. Id
100. Id
101. Alberty-Velez, 361 F.3d at 10.
102. The Bachelor FAQ Answered, supra note 87.
103. Id.
104. Claybrooks v. ABC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
105. The Bachelor FAQ Answered, supra note 87.
106. Id.
107. Id
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benefits or tax benefits.' 08 The parties rarely believe that they are creating
an employment relationship because the producers cast the participants as
contestants, not employees.109 The courts, however, should recognize that
the producers create these circumstances by hiring free labor for the
projects from which they make tens of millions of dollars.110 Moreover, in
the reality television context, the producers' control over the participants'
entire lives is too extensive such that the control factor should simply
outweigh the factors that weigh in favor of classifying them as independent
contractors.
Although this issue has never been addressed in the reality television
context, courts have dealt with the employee classification analysis in many
other industries. They have reached inconsistent conclusions on similar
facts involving different industries because they are often tasked with
finding the definition of "employee" under a myriad of different
circumstances. As Alberty- Velez suggests, the nature of the television
industry adds another dimension to the already complicated test.
Nevertheless, no court has decided on this issue in the reality television
108. See id ("Q: Do the girls get paid to compete on the 'Bachelor? A: 'Not one single
penny,' said Ashleigh Hunt. However, the Bachelorette/Bachelor is paid a hefty sum for starring
on the show."). The "hefty sum" that the Bachelor or Bachelorette receives is "a stipend."
Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
109. Reality television producers that refuse to label contestants as "employees" for purposes
of Title VII protections, have no qualms about calling them "employees" to protect the producers'
intellectual property rights. For example, in a discrimination suit against the producers of
American Idol, the producers "maintained that the plaintiffs were 'contestants on a reality singing
competition, not employees under Title VII." Luchina Fisher, 'American Idol' Discrimination
Suit Moves Forward, ABC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/
contestants-employees-american-idol-discrimination-lawsuit-moves-forward/story?id=20240495
&page=2. Nevertheless, the Production Deal Memo between American Idol Productions, Inc.
and one of the plaintiffs has revealed that the producers require American Idol contestants to sign
a contract that explicitly refers to them as "employees" whose services are "deemed 'Works
Made For Hire' for Producer within the meaning of the U.S. Copyright laws." Production
Personnel Deal Memo, 1.2, AMERICAN IDOL PRODS., INC., Mar. 3, 2003, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/page/employment-eligibility-verification-form-
signed-american-idol-season-20319974; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2014) (defining a "work
made for hire" as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment").
Interestingly, the inquiry into the employment status of an applicant under the Copyright Act is
similar to the inquiry under Title VII. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739-40 (1989). Under Title VII, producers benefit if they classify reality television actors as
independent contractors. When the producers wish to secure the copyright of a reality show,
however, they conveniently classify the actors as employees because the employer is the owner of
a copyright if it had contracted for a creative work prepared by an employee within the scope of
employment. See id. at 744 n.9. The proper classification of a reality show actor's employment
status should not depend on whether one term would create more legal obligations on the actor's
part or not, and courts should take notice of this double standard created by industry practices.
110. See Ocasio v. RAAD Broad. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 ("The fact that RAAD
nominally hired [the plaintiffs] and other producers as independent contractors .. . says little
about what type of control it had over the production of the show.").
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context. Thus, a continuous application of Title VII to discriminatory
casting decisions involving different facts and circumstances may be one
way to settle the law in this area.
Courts should take into consideration whether a blanket ruling that
protects discriminatory casting practices under the First Amendment is fair,
and whether it is consistent with constitutional rights. Certainly, it would
require the courts to find the balance between artistic freedom and
employment rights (a dichotomy that is difficult to reconcile), but the
courts should not allow the nature of the industry to immunize itself from
the application of employment discrimination law.112
2. Discrimination Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 US.C. § 1981
Where a court decides that a reality television participant is not an
employee under Title VII, he or she may have recourse under 42 U.S.C. §
1981.113 Section 1981 applies only to racial discrimination in the formation
and enforcement of private and public contracts,'1 4 including post-
formation conduct within contractual relations. 115 Despite this limitation,
section 1981 has an important advantage over Title VII for reality show
applicant plaintiffs where courts find that they are independent contractors.
111. Of course, a continuous application of Title VII to discriminatory casting is possible
only if discriminated individuals are willing to come forward with their complaints.
112. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) ("The business of the
Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press.. . . [It] has
no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."). In Associated Press, the
petitioner, the publisher of a newspaper, argued that the National Labor Relations Act abridged
the petitioner's freedom of the press because it could not "be free to furnish unbiased and
impartial news reports unless it [was] equally free to determine for itself the partiality or bias of
editorial employees." Id. at 131. The Court called this argument "an unsound generalization,"
and concluded that the Associated Press was not immune from the NLRA. Id. at 131-33.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2014) ("[A]ll persons ... shall have the same right. . . to make
and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .... ). This section is recognized as a
constitutional exercise of Congress' power to enact appropriate legislation for the enforcement of
the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Waters v. Wis.
Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1970); see also Johnson v. Ry.
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (stating that a discrimination plaintiff "clearly is ...
not limited to Title VII in his search for relief").
114. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987); see also Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) ("[Section] 1981 . . . reaches private conduct.").
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (defining "make and enforce contracts" to include "the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship). Until 1991, courts
interpreted that section 1981 did not govern post-formation conduct. John Hope Franklin, The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 1135, 1148 (1990). Congress, however,
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and defined section 1981 "to include post-contract-
formation conduct." CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).
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The statute applies more broadly than Title VII-to all contracts,
including employment contracts-independent of a plaintiffs Title VII
claims.116  As the Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., a plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim and a section 1981
claim together'17 "based upon the same facts."118 To have an actionable
claim under section 1981, a plaintiff must allege that the purported
employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff such that the
conduct at issue interfered with the plaintiffs right to make or enforce
contracts. Thus, even if a court concludes that the plaintiff is not an
employee under Title VII, the plaintiff may still proceed on the section
1981 claim on the basis of the alleged contractual relationship."'9 In this
respect, section 1981 provides an additional form of pleading unlawful
employment discrimination.
Additionally, a plaintiff who proves intentional discrimination under
Title VII would also be entitled to compensatory and punitive damages "to
the same extent and under the same standards that they are available to
plaintiffs under [section] 1981.",120 This statute, however, "is simply under-
invoked" because litigants and attorneys are not as familiar with it as they
are with Title VII.12 1 As a result, independent contractors tend to sue under
Title VII, rather than section 1981, which leads to a dismissal of the suit.1 22
Unsurprisingly, to analyze a section 1981 claim, courts apply the same
legal framework applied to determine the existence of an employment
relationship under Title VII. 123  Proving intentional discrimination,
however, is just as complicated as proving the existence of an employment
relationship. To evaluate circumstantial evidence of discrimination under
section 1981 (or Title VII), courts engage in a three-step burden-shifting
framework. First, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.124 Second, assuming the plaintiff meets his or
116. See Johnson, 421 U.S. 459-60. Another advantage of section 1981 claim is that the
scope of the statute "is not limited by the scope of [the plaintiff|'s EEOC charges." Robinson v.
N & C Const. Co., 767 F. Supp. 843, 845 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
117. Johnson, 421 U.S. 459-60.
118. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Johnson
421 U.S. at 459-62).
119. Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2009).
120. Lowery, 206 F.3d at 441.
121. Danielle Taranto, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination
Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170,195-96 n. 154 (2006).
122. Id.
123. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989). As discussed infra Part
I.B, however, finding direct evidence of intentional discrimination is extremely difficult, and as
such, most plaintiffs will have to prove their cases through circumstantial evidence.
124. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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her initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for taking the action in question.1 25
Finally, provided the defendant was able to sufficiently articulate such a
reason, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's stated reason was
pretextual.1 26
A plaintiff can meet the initial burden of making out a prima facie case
of hiring discrimination by showing that: (1) he belongs to a protected
class; (2) he was qualified for the position for which he applied; (3) he was
nonetheless denied the position; and (4) a similarly situated person outside
his class was treated differently (i.e., that person obtained the position
instead or under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination).1 27 Had the plaintiffs in Claybrooks had the opportunity to
litigate their Title VII claim, proceed on their section 1981 claim, or litigate
both claims, they would have met their initial burden.1 28 They were both
African-American, a protected category under both Title VII and section
1981. They likely qualified for the Bachelor position because they were
both single, well-respected members of their communities, well-educated
and well-established professionals.1 2 9  They were both denied for the
position, and instead a white male, who would likely be a similarly situated
applicant, became the Bachelor.1 30
In the traditional employment context, finding a similarly situated
person outside of the plaintiffs class, who obtained the precise position, is
often the most challenging task because the comparator "must be similarly
situated in all material respects."'3 ' Courts often compare the comparator's
prior work experience to that of the plaintiff 32 (or terms of services if the
125. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
126. Id at 804.
127. Id, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
128. To determine whether the First Amendment is an affirmative defense to the plaintiffs'
section 1981 claim, the court assumed that the producers "did discriminate on the basis of race."
Claybrooks v. ABC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). Nevertheless, the court never
reached the question whether the plaintiffs carried their initial burden of making out a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination on the ground that "the First Amendment protects the
producers' right unilaterally to control their own creative content." Id. at 1000; see generally id
at 996-1000.
129. See Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also The Bachelor and The
Bachelorette Eligibility Requirements, supra note 33.
130. Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1 at 11-12.
131. McGuiness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49,54 (2d Cir. 2001).
132. See Lawrence v. Mehlman, 389 F. App'x 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that plaintiff
was not similarly situated with alleged comparator because plaintiff "was significantly more
experienced" than comparator); Bio v. Fed. Express Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that a four-year gap in experience between plaintiff and alleged comparator
"precludes a finding that the two were similarly situated").
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plaintiff is an independent contractor).'33 In the context of The Bachelor,
finding similarly situated comparators would not be too onerous because
the show does not involve any prior related work experience in the related
field or certain terms of services, such as pricing offer, as casting criteria.
This situation is also different from other employment situations in the
entertainment industry, which would have at least the prior work
experience factor to compare a plaintiff to a comparator.
As illustrated, a section 1981 claim is an attractive choice for
employment discrimination claims because a plaintiff may plead both Title
VII and section 1981 claims based on the same facts. Moreover, even
those plaintiffs who do not qualify as "employees" under Title VII can
pursue a section 1981 claim if discrimination occurred within a contractual
relationship. Nevertheless, if courts allow the First Amendment as a
complete bar to section 1981 claims, producers that make unscripted reality
shows using open casting calls (as opposed to Breakdown services) 134 Will
continue to escape any legal obligations under section 198 1.
4. State Civil Rights Law-California as an Example
A third potential claim would arise under a state civil rights statute,
such as California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (the "Unruh Act").1 3 6 For
example, if discrimination occurs within California, the plaintiff could
argue that the producer violated the Unruh Act by denying access to an
open casting call, which invited the general public. This Act protects all
persons within its jurisdiction from arbitrary discrimination based on race,
color, or a number of other protected categories, by "all business
establishment of every kind whatsoever" in furnishing "accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services." 37
The Unruh Act does not apply to employment discrimination.'3 8 As
such, where a court finds that the plaintiff is an independent contractor, the
133. See, e.g., Harris v. Hays, 452 F.3d 714, 718-19 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that plaintiff
was not similarly situated with alleged comparators because the plaintiff did not make similar
pricing offers).
134. See supra Part II.A. for distinctions between scripted television shows and unscripted
shows.
135. See infra Part III.B.1. for discussion on the First Amendment as an affirmative defense
to discrimination claims.
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (2014).
137. Id. § 51(b) (emphasis added). Other protected categories are sex, religion, ancestry,
national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, and sexual
orientation. Id.
138. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 (1970). One California court has ruled
that the Unruh Act does not cover "the claims of an independent contractor." Cochran v. CBS
Corp., No. BC432836, 2011 WL 9522592 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2011). At the time of writing
this note, an exhaustive examination of approximately 1,800 cases filed under the Unruh Act
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plaintiff could invoke the Unruh Act by arguing that a casting call is a
public accommodation. Like section 1981, the Unruh Act prohibits only
intentional discrimination, and requires a plaintiff show that a business
establishment has committed "willful, affirmative misconduct," which is
"more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy."'39
Reality television contestants who do not qualify to be employees may
nonetheless be "patrons" who are invited to attend an open casting call, and
the open casting call may be a "business establishment" within the meaning
of the Unruh Act.1 4 0 Because the Act regulates "all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever," California courts have held that a business
establishment need not have nexus to "a fixed location" as long as it is "a
permanent 'commercial force or organization."'l 4 1 In National Federation
of Blind v. Target Corp., the court found that the Target.com website was a
business establishment because it is a place "to which the general public is
invited." 4 2 In Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., the court found that Netflix's online
streaming video library was "a kind of business establishment and an
accommodation, advantage, facility, and privilege of a place of public
accommodation." 43 In Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc., the court
did not disagree with the plaintiffs allegation that closed captioning
service was a public accommodation because it provides access to "benefits
and advantages offered by CNN.com."l 44  Thus, the Act covers a wide
variety of entities and accommodations, regardless of their nexus to a
physical location, as long as the transaction is commercial in nature, and
once engaged, has the potential to provide accommodation, privilege, or
benefits to the general public.
In U.S. Western Falun Dafa Association v. Chinese Chamber of
Commerce, the plaintiff sued the defendant for denying several of the
plaintiffs application to operate a booth at an annual street fair, which "is
revealed that only this one case involved an employment discrimination claim. The plaintiff,
however, linked her claims under the Unruh Act with her employment, and the court disagreed
with her that her claims fell under the Act. Id. The vast majority of cases filed under the Unruh
Act have dealt with discrimination in public accommodation because of disability. But, as
already explained in detail, the Act covers all kinds of business establishments and commercial
transactions not stemming from employment.
139. Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824, 853 (2005)).
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.
141. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790-95 (1983)).
142. Id. at 1198.
143. Cullen v. Neflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Target
Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1196).
144. Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, 742 F.3d at 421.
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open to the public to attend."l4 5 For its Unruh Act analysis, the court
treated the street fair as a public accommodation that invited the public to
attend and participate. 14 6 Similarly, open castings calls invite the public to
submit applications to attend the audition and to participate in a
competition, which provides entertainment to the general public.
On the other hand, in Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services,
Inc., the plaintiff sued a radio broadcasting company for refusing to allow
him to participate in a call-in radio talk show because of his age.1 47 The
court found that the talk show was not a public accommodation to which
the Unruh Act applied because the First Amendment allowed the radio
station to refuse or accept certain speakers on the talk show. 14 8 Thus,
according to the Ingels court, a talk show is deemed not open to the general
public because the First Amendment allows a radio station to lawfully
exclude certain people from participating in the talk show.
As the above two cases demonstrate, it is difficult to predict whether a
court will find that an open casting call for a reality television is a public
accommodation. A case similar to Claybrooks would be a question of first
impression under the Unruh Act. Instead of agreeing with the Ingels court,
perhaps a court could decide that a caller-screening process on an on-air
radio talk show is fundamentally different from denying a certain class of
people equal access to an audition that is open to the general public. The
court can also draw the main distinction from the fact that a radio caller
calls in to a talk show to give his opinion, and if his opinion is not
appropriate for the image of the show, the radio station arguably need to
control which callers to be on the air.1 4 9 On the other hand, single people
apply to audition for The Bachelor and The Bachelorette to compete on the
show, not to be the voice or to give an opinion on behalf of ABC.
Moreover, the plaintiff in Ingels was sixty-five years old when the show
was described as "an extremely popular singles-oriented radio talk show"
that attracted young people, thereby not exactly meeting the show's
demographic. 50 Racial discrimination during an audition for most reality
television shows is different because the shows do not openly seek
Caucasian only. For example, ABC's own website states that the show has
145. U.S. W. Falun Dafa Ass'n v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 163 Cal. App. 4th
590, 593-94 (2008) (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1055 (2005).
148. Id. at 1072.
149. Id. at 1055-56.
150. Id. at 1055.
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produced "an eclectic mix of Bachelors over the years," though it has never
once included a person of color. 5 1
When Mr. Johnson walked into the hotel lobby where the audition was
taking place, a white employee of the defendant's immediately stopped him
and asked why he was there.1 5 2 When he responded that he was there to
apply for The Bachelor, the white employee offered to take his application
materials and pass them on to the show's casting directors.'53 Mr. Johnson
noticed that several white applicants passed by him, but the defendants'
employees did not stop the white applicants at all from proceeding to the
audition.1 54 Under the Unruh Act, Mr. Johnson may have a better case
because he was actually denied access to the location where the audition
was taking place. In the next section, this note will analyze the First
Amendment problem and other potential challenges. It will also argue that
the current First Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate to address
discriminatory casting.
B. Potential Challenges to Discrimination Claims
1. The First Amendment as an Affirmative Defense to All Types of Claims
The First Amendment provides the most robust defense to
discrimination claims against creative art by protecting freedom of artistic
expression, which includes artistic expression in entertainment, television
programs, and dramatic works.'55  In Claybrooks, the court addressed
whether casting decisions are artistic expression, and held they are "part
and parcel of the creative process behind a television program." 56 Thus,
applying legislation-for example, section 1981-to regulate casting
decisions is subject to strict judicial scrutiny because it would essentially
regulate "speech based on its content, i.e., the race(s) of the Show's
respective cast members." 57
The court compared the case to a Supreme Court case, in which a
Massachusetts public accommodation statute prohibited parade organizers
from discriminating against an activist group based on its members' sexual
orientation.' 58 Because the statute had been "applied in a peculiar way" to
control "the expressive content of their parade," the court concluded that it
151. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
152. Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
153. Id.
154. Id
155. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
156. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 992-93.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 993-95 (discussing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston,
515 U.S. 557 (1995)).
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would impermissibly abridge the parade organizers' free speech rights.159
The Claybrooks court relied on the Hurley court's conclusion that "a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message,"
including whom to choose as participants, and "that choice is presumed to
lie beyond the government's power to control."l60 The court further
concluded that the same principle applied to section 1981 claims, and to
"casting decisions for at least some types of television programs, but not
all."1 6 1 The court did not specify to what extent that principle would not
apply. 162
The court recognized that the plaintiffs' goals were "laudable" in
seeking "to support the social acceptance of interracial relationships, to
eradicate outdated racial taboos, and to encourage television networks not
to perpetuate outdated racial stereotypes."1 6 3 Nevertheless, the court stated
that the First Amendment would prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing these
goals "by forcing the defendants to employ race-neutral criteria in their
casting decisions in order to 'showcase' a more progressive message."'
Notably, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that The Bachelor
and The Bachelorette are content-neutral, "identity-themed programming,"
and that the First Amendment did not apply to such reality shows.1 65 The
court instead adopted the producers' position that "applying
antidiscrimination laws to casting decisions ... would threaten the content
of various television programs and television networks . . . targeting
particular demographic groups." 6 Such networks include "the Lifetime
Network (targeted to female audiences), the Black Entertainment Channel
(targeted to African-Americans), Telemundo (targeted to Latinos), the
Jewish Channel, the Christian Broadcast Channel, the Inspiration Network
(targeted to Protestants), and LOGO (targeted to gays and lesbians)."16 7
While recognizing that this case presented an unprecedented issue, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' position on the ground that they failed to cite
any authority for the "purported distinction between 'identity-themed
programming' and other forms of television programming." 68
159. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 994-95.
160. Id. at 995.
161. Id. at 996.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1000.
164. Id.
165. Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 997-98 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 998.
167. Id
168. Id. at 996, 998.
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Perhaps a distinction may be made on the basis that The Bachelor and
The Bachelorette are broadcast on a major network channel-ABC-that
targets all types of viewers, rather than on an ethnic, religious, or sexual
orientation-based cable channel that targets a special group of viewers. For
example, ethnic media "tell the stories of vibrant [ethnic minority groups]
. . . in languages other than English."l 69 The nature of reality televisions
shows like The Bachelor and The Bachelorette may have an incidental
effect of attracting certain groups of viewers. But major television
producers do not advertise such reality shows as targeting special groups of
people, nor should major television networks actually target certain
minority groups as do Telemundo, LOGO, and other similar networks.
Discriminatory casting in content-neutral, reality-based television
shows adversely affects the employment rights of racial minorities, and
interferes with efforts to promote diversity in media.1 7 0 As the Supreme
Court recognized more than forty years ago, "the Constitution ... places no
value on discrimination.""'7  Moreover, Congress has made "discrimination
unlawful in certain significant contexts," such as employment.1 72 Under
Claybrooks, however, the First Amendment defense allows television
producers to continue to engage in unlawful discrimination.
To overcome a discrimination claim, a defendant-producer must show
that "the burden [placed on the producers] must be substantial to warrant
First Amendment intervention."17 3 For example, where casting a person of
certain color or race is significant to the narrative, the burden placed on the
producer would be substantial. 174 Nonidentity-themed reality television
programs, however, do not share the same concern. In this respect, courts
should put more emphasis on employment rights, and begin applying Title
VII to employment relationships and section 1981 to contractual
169. MATTHEW D. MATSAGANIS, VIKKI S. KATZ, & SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH,
UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC MEDIA: PRODUCERS, CONSUMERS, AND SOCIETIES 3, SAGE PUBL'NS,
INC. (2011).
170. See Greg Braxton, Film, TV Industry's Diversity Doesn't Look Like America's, Report
Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/12/
entertainment/la-et-st-diversity-film-tv-20140212 (quoting Darnell Hunt, the director of UCLA's
Ralph J. Bunche Center for African American Studies, and the lead author of a study titled 2014
Hollywood Diversity Report: Making Sense of the Disconnect) ("Hollywood is woefully out of
touch with an emerging America" that is "becoming more and more diverse.").
171. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 470 (1973)).
172. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470 (citing Title VII as an example of "significant contexts").
173. Robinson, supra note 24, at 65.
174. See id. at 65-67 (arguing that breakdowns for movies violate Title VII because they
intentionally discriminate people of color, and that courts should allow First Amendment defense
only where there is a strong showing that racial discrimination is necessary to deliver the
narrative accurately).
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relationship.s7 5  To achieve this result, litigants should first frame their
issues accordingly, especially where their working conditions strongly
point to an employment relationship. The courts should then assess
discrimination claims by placing fundamental employment rights on an
equal footing as the First Amendment, by recognizing congressional intent
to eradicate intentional discrimination in American workplace.' 76
2. The Bona Fide Occupation Qualification Exception to Title VII Claims
Another potential defense to a Title VII claim is a Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification or "BFOQ" defense, which exempts an
employer from liability if the employer hires workers qualified on the basis
of religion, sex, or national origin. For reality television producers, a
BFOQ defense may initially appear to be the most attractive argument for
avoiding Title VII liability altogether because they could argue that viewers
prefer to see contestants who resemble ancestors of certain national origin,
such as Irish or English.' 78 But demonstrating a BFOQ defense is a heavy
burden for a defendant to meet, because courts have held that customer
preference is not a valid BFOQ unless the defendant satisfies the following
two prongs of the inquiry: (1) the preference is the "essence of the
business"'7 9 and (2) the preference must be related to the applicant's ability
to perform the job.'80 The first prong evaluates whether the preferred
characteristic is "so essential to job performance that a member of [another
group] simply could not do the same job."'8' The second prong looks to
whether the preference is "so important to the operation of the business that
175. See generally id. (applying Title VII to movie casting); see also Basham, supra note 59
(applying Title VII to movie casting and proposing particular solutions tailored to Native
American).
176. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971)
(construing congressional intent in enacting Title VII as "to provide a foundation in the law for
the principle of nondiscrimination ... and more importantly, [to] enable individuals to develop as
individuals"). For an argument to advance Title VII as compelling governmental interest in
eliminating employment discrimination to overcome a First Amendment challenge, see Part IV.A.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2014). The BFOQ defense applies only to disparate treatment
claims, i.e., intentional discrimination, not to disparate impact claims. See Ferrill v. Parker Grp.,
Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1146
n.14 (3d Cir. 1988). In disparate impact cases, however, the employer-defendant can raise a
business necessity defense, which is a counterpart of the BFOQ defense but is not applicable to
intentional discrimination claims. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); see also In re Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1990).
178. See Robinson, supra note 24, at 40 (explaining that Title VII on its face does not
provide BFOQ defense for race, but that it includes national origin and that "defendants could try
to use this exception to justify racial discrimination in breakdowns).
179. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388; see also Frank, supra note 59, at 476.
180. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
181. Id.
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the business would be undermined if employees of the "wrong" [group]
were hired."1 82
Thus, the BFOQ defense, if successful, allows the employer to retain
the essential nature of its business while hiring based on an applicant's
religion, sex, or national origin without violating Title VII.'83  Congress
recognized that discriminatory hiring was often "morally acceptable, but
also made sound economic sense."' 84  The EEOC guidelines also
acknowledge that discriminatory casting is sometimes necessary "for the
purpose of authenticity or genuineness," 8 5 but such a BFOQ argument
does not apply to race.'86
In one of the earlier Title VII cases interpreting the essence of business
prong, the Fifth Circuit explained that courts should "apply a business
necessity test, not a business convenience test."187 The court adopted the
EEOC's interpretation that the BFOQ is an extremely narrow exception to
Title VII liabilities, and applies only where BFOQs are "'reasonably
necessary' to the operation of that 'particular' enterprise."'88  Six years
later, the United States Supreme Court also adopted the same rationale.' 89
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the airline employer
asserted a BFOQ defense based on its overwhelming customer preference
for service by female flight attendants.' 90 The court concluded that the
airline's BFOQ defense was invalid because the essence of the airline
business was transporting passengers, not providing a more "pleasant
environment" and "cosmetic effect."' 9' Similarly, in Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co., the court rejected Southwest Airline's BFOQ defense that
"females are required . . . to attract [] male customers who prefer female
attendants and ticket agents, and to preserve the authenticity and
genuineness of Southwest's unique, female corporate personality."' 9 2 The
court explained that "the sex-linked aspects of the job must predominate"
182. Id. (citing Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235 n.27 (5th Cir. 1976)).
183. Frank, supra note 59, at 476.
184. Id. at 476 & n.12.
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2014).
186. Title VII allows employers to post ads indicating their preferences so long as the BFOQ
is one of sex, religion or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2014). Race-based
discrimination may be justified where the role requires a certain race classification. For example,
PBS would not hire a white female to play the part of Dr. Martin Luther King in a documentary.
See Frank, supra note 59, at 473.
187. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
188. Id. at 387.
189. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-35 (1977).
190. Diaz. 442 F.2d at 388-89.
191. Id at 388.
192. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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to warrant such a BFOQ, such that hiring employees of the opposite sex
prevents the company from performing "the primary function or service it
offers."l 93
Adopting the EEOC's guidelines, the Wilson court compared the
essence of an airline business to that of an actor or actress. 194 The court
stated that the primary function of an actor or actress "is to fulfill the
audience's expectation and desire for a particular role, characterized by
particular physical or emotional traits."1 95 For example, "being female has
been deemed a BFOQ for the position of a Playboy Bunny" because,
without female sexuality, the Playboy Club cannot perform the service of
"titillate[ing] and entic[ing] male customers."l96 The court rejected
Southwest's BFOQ on the ground that its customer preference for females
was not so strong or established to conclude that hiring male employees
would undermine the essence of the business-carrying passengers from
one point to another.1 9 7
In the context of dating competition shows like The Bachelor and The
Bachelorette, the only viable defense, even if so remotely, may be national
origin. Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, who were the prime
supporters of Title VII, explained that a director of a play or movie does
not have to demonstrate a BFOQ to hire someone who fits certain physical
appearances of a role. 198 For example, a television producer could "cast an
actor in the role of a Negro" based on the actor's "physical appearance,"
regardless of whether the person is a Negro. 199 Such circumstances would
most likely arise in docudramas featuring people of certain national origin,
but not likely in reality shows, especially when the viewers themselves
come from diverse backgrounds.200 Moreover, the skin color of the
Bachelor or Bachelorette would make "no appreciable difference to the
production."20 1 Indeed, when Congress enacted Title VII, it did not include
race or color as a BFOQ presumably because Congress could not conceive
of any situation in which race could be a valid qualification for a job.
193. Id. at 301.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id (citations omitted).
197. Id at 302-03.
199. 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964).
200. Id.
200. See Cynthia Lee, Study Finds TV Shows with Ethnically Diverse Casts, Writers Have
Higher Ratings, UCLA NEWSROOM (Oct. 8, 2013), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/study-
finds-that-tv-shows-with-248757 ("Racial diversity does make a marked and measurable
difference to television's bottom line, and that "people are watching shows that reflect and relate
to their own experiences.").
201. Frank, supra note 59, at 474.
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It is easy to see how a docudrama about the American Civil War would
require that persons of certain national origin play certain characters. In
that case, accurately depicting the racial divide that in many ways defined
the Civil War era is, at least arguably, crucial to the program. But it is
perhaps more difficult to see how a reality television producer could make
similar or analogous arguments about their show(s). In the context of
dating competition or talent search shows, it is difficult to imagine that a
person's national origin would in any way affect his or her ability perform
the dating, singing, or dancing roles. Moreover, such a preference simply
does not accurately paint the picture of today's American society. After all,
diverse backgrounds reflect the reality of America.20 2
3. California's Anti-SLAPP Statute Defense to FEHA and Unruh Act Claims
California's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation) statute "provides for the early dismissal of unmeritorious
claims filed to interfere with the valid exercise of the constitutional rights
of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances." 203 The
protections under this statute apply to state law claims, 204 so it would apply
to discrimination claims under both the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act ("FEHA") and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
In granting a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Califronia
courts engage in a two-step process. 20 5 First, the courts decides whether the
defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action
is one arising from a protected activity (i.e., that the act or acts of which
plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of defendant's right of
petition or free speech).206 If the defendant has made such a showing, the
court then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
"probability" of prevailing on the claim. 2 0 7 If, however, the defendant has
failed to meet its burden in the first step, the court must deny the motion.208
In Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., the plaintiff filed an employment
discrimination claim, alleging that CBS Broadcasting refused to hire him as
an on-air weather news anchor because of his gender and age in violation
202. Cf id. ("[W]ith the U.S. population becoming more diverse, 'this new emerging
America will undoubtedly continue to express its diversifying experiences and tastes by making
programming choices that resonate more faithfully with them."').
203. Hunter v. CBS Broad., Inc., 221 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519 (2013); see also CAL. CODE
Civ. PROC. § 425.16 (2014).
204. Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
205. Hunter, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1519.
206. Id.; see also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16(e).
207. Hunter, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1519.
208. Id.
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of the FEHA.209 CBS television stations allegedly replaced him with
"younger attractive females," even though "he was 'far more qualified, and
far more experienced' to serve as a weather anchor than [the younger
attractive females]."210 In response, CBS filed a special motion to strike
under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the plaintiffs claims
arose from CBS' selection of on-air weather reporters and that such
conduct was taken in furtherance of the defendant's free speech rights and,
therefore, constituted a protected activity.211 CBS claimed that its local
radio operation was one of the largest in the nation, and that the primary
reason people watched the local news was to obtain weather information. 212
According to CBS, its "weather anchors were 'local celebrities' who had a
significant effect on newscast ratings," and "selecting on-air news
personnel, and the weather anchor in particular, was 'one of the most
critical decisions in putting together a news team."' 213 The CBS executive
who interviewed the plaintiff did not believe he had the talent, skill or on-
air presence to be a weather broadcaster in the Los Angeles market.2 14
In his opposition to CBS' anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff argued that
"the 'gravemen' of his claims 'was discrimination rather than free
speech,"' and that employment discrimination was not a valid exercise of
free speech rights.2 15 He further contended that "CBS was essentially
argu[ing] that it, along with every other producer of programming, enjoys
complete immunity from FEHA liability based on the First
Amendment."216
The court disagreed, concluding that, in determining the first step of
the anti-SLAPP analysis, it evaluates "the core injury-producing conduct
upon which the plaintiffs claim is premised," not "the labeling of the
claim." 2 17  Therefore, even if the plaintiff labeled his claim as an
employment discrimination claim, the core injury-producing conduct was
CBS' broadcasting weather forecast on local television, which is protected
by the First Amendment.2 18
For most First Amendment analyses, the inquiry would end once the
court determines that the defendant's speech or conduct is protected by the
209. Id. at 1513-15; see also FEHA, CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (2014).
210. Hunter, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1514.
211. Id. at 1515.
212. Id
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1516.
215. Id.
216. Hunter, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1517.
217. Id. at 1520.
218. Id.
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First Amendment. California's anti-SLAPP inquiry, however, does not end
there. Rather, once the court determines that the plaintiffs claim arose
from the defendant's protected activity, the court must engage in the
second step to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on his or her claims.219 In Hunter, although the
court found that the plaintiffs claim arose from CBS' protected activity, it
remanded the case to the trial court on the second step in the analysis
because the trial court had held that CBS' discrimination did not arise from
a protected activity.220
Thus, where a court finds that a casting discrimination claim arises
from protected activity within the meaning of California's anti-SLAPP
statute, if the plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his or
her claim, the case will survive the anti-SLAPP challenge. To achieve that
effect in the reality television context, a plaintiff must first establish an
employment relationship by applying the common law agency test
discussed in supra Part III.A. 1. Then the plaintiff should also advance an
argument for placing employment rights on an equal footing as the First
Amendment right to freedom of expression. To overcome a First
Amendment challenge, including the protections under California's anti-
SLAPP statute, the plaintiff should consider an argument for advancing
Title VII as compelling governmental interest in eliminating employment
discrimination, which this note discusses below.22 1
IV. Proposal: Reducing Discriminatory Casting Practices
A. Title VH as Compelling Governmental Interest in Eliminating
Employment Discrimination
To extend the Title VII or FEHA protections to discriminatory casting
decisions, litigants and the courts must view them through the lens of equal
employment rights. As discussed in Part III.A. 1, the working conditions on
certain unscripted reality shows strongly point to an employment
relationship, rather than an independent contractor relationship.
Nevertheless, the lack of precedent on the employee classification question
involving the television industry 22 2 could simply reflect that plaintiffs have
not argued their case in terms of equal employment rights. Courts, to be
sure, appear unwilling to trump the First Amendment rights with
antidiscrimination law due to the creative nature of production decisions in
the entertainment industry. Absent a "compelling government interest," the
219. Id. at 1519.
220. Id. at 1527-28.
221. See infra Part IV.A.
222. See supra Part II.C.
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First Amendment's primacy appears unlikely to change. 22 3 What follows is
a potential argument that reality television applicant could make in favor of
finding a compelling government interest.
In cases where Title VII rights clash with the First Amendment free
exercise rights, the Ninth Circuit has held that "Title VII establishes
compelling governmental interest in eliminating employment
discrimination," and protection of employees from discrimination is
"essential to accomplish the purpose of Title VII." 22 4  In the religious
context, Congress created a ministerial exception to Title VII because "the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment require a
narrowing construction of Title VII in order to insulate the relationship
between a religious organization and its ministers from constitutionally
impermissible interference by the government." 2 25  Like regulations
restricting free speech rights, regulations restricting free exercise rights
must demonstrate "the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the
burden imposed upon the exercise of the religious belief." 2 26
In EEOC v. Pacific Press Publication Association, the Press challenged
the EEOC's Title VII enforcement on the grounds that the statute violated
the First Amendment "to the extent they reach any Press activities." 22 7 The
Press also claimed that "Congress lacks authority to legislate with respect
to religious institutions because each provision of the Bill of Rights
overrides the powers expressly granted to Congress in the Constitution."228
The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments and concluded that the Press
failed to demonstrate that Title VII impermissibly burdened the free
exercise of the Press's religious beliefs.229
The court applied a three-step analysis to determine whether Title VII
violated the First Amendment: (1) "the magnitude of the statute's impact
upon the exercise of the religious belief"; (2) "the existence of a
compelling state interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exercise of
the religious belief; and (3) "the extent to which recognition of an
223. See Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 992-93 (stating that to survive strict scrutiny, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) applying a legislation to discriminatory casting advances a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) the legislation must be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest).
224. EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'n Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982); see also
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999) (prohibiting
sexual harassment under Title VII because such conduct was "inconsistent with [the church's]
values and beliefs").
225. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945.
226. Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1279.
227. Id. at 1278.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1279.
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exemption from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be
advanced by the state."2 3 0 The court stated that prohibiting the church-
employer from discriminating against the employee, as required by Title
VII, did not infringe the church's free exercise rights because the church
advocated nondiscrimination against women and minority groups.231 Thus,
the court held that enforcing Title VII on the church would place only a
minimal burden.232
In another case involving a sexual harassment claim against a church,
the Ninth Circuit explained that "[s]ome religious interests under the Free
Exercise Clause are so strong that no compelling state interest justifies
government intrusion into the ecclesiastical sphere."233 There, the court
held that "Title VII applies without a constitutionally compelled exception"
where the church is not acting within the constitutional bounds.234
Although these Ninth Circuit cases involve a completely different industry,
they at least suggest that the First Amendment is not a complete bar to
discrimination claims.
Perhaps future litigants could employ the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
arguing that Title VII applies to discriminatory casting decisions where the
producers themselves engage in unlawful discrimination. Such
circumstances could arise where producers cast participants to appear on a
reality show that requires no predetermined roles. Moreover, one of the
producers of The Bachelor and The Bachelorette publicly denied the
accusation of discrimination on the show.23 5 The producer blamed the lack
of diverse applicants, and in one interview stated: "We always want to cast
for ethnic diversity. It's just that for whatever reason, they don't come
forward. I wish they would." 2 3 6 Therefore, the Claybrooks court, like the
Ninth Circuit, could have held that applying section 1981 to regulate
discriminatory casting amounted to a compelling state interest to protect
minorities from arbitrary discrimination. Additionally, enforcing section
1981 would place only a minimal burden on the producers because,
according to the foregoing statement, the shows' producers at least appear
to be seeking to diversify the casting pool. Perhaps if the plaintiffs litigated
their Title VII claims, the court could have reached this conclusion.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1279.
233. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Socy's of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999).
234. Id. at 944.
235. Claybrooks Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
236. Id.
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B. Industry Self-Regulation
1. Changes to SAG-AFTRA Membership and EEO Policy
SAG-AFTRA is a union representative to "more than 160,000 media
professionals," who are "the faces and voices that entertain and inform
America and the world." 23 7  The union "negotiates wages and working
conditions in order to maintain minimum standards for its members." 23 8
The union prides itself on its strength in diversity, 239 and its "commit[ment]
to broad[] employment and involvement" for its members, regardless of
race.240 The union has an Equal Employment Opportunity & Diversity
Department that monitors discriminatory employment practices, and seeks
to increase diversity in its membership. 241 The union requires every union-
covered television agreement to state the non-discrimination policy-that
,,242 ethe "[p]roducer is committed to diverse, inclusive casting. As discussed
in section II.C., however, first-time reality television applicants cannot
benefit from the union's protection because they do not have the requisite
employment in a union-covered position.
Without union representation, reality show applicants are left to
bargain with the producers individually. Unchecked, reality television
producers-such as the producers of The Bachelor and The Bachelorette-
have shown their willingness to use casting practices that are squarely
inconsistent with SAG-AFTRA's goal of preventing discrimination in the
industries of which its members are a part. Thus, one way to combat
discriminatory casting practices in reality television casting is to allow
reality show applicants to receive union protection.
SAG-AFTRA recognizes that the popularity of reality television affects
employment rates among its member actors.2 43  As major networks and
producers turn to reality television for more and more revenue, the union
may continue to lose membership, thereby diminishing its collective
bargaining power. SAG-AFTRA can attempt to minimize discriminatory
237. Union Information, supra note 50.
238. Member Benefits, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/content/member-benefits (last
visited Oct. 3, 2014).
239. Union Information, supra note 50.
240. Id
241. EEO & Diversity, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/EEODiversity%20 (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
242. Summary of the Agreement for the 2011 Screen Actors Guild Basic and Television
Agreements and the 2011 AFTRA Exhibit A to the Network Television Code, SAG-AFTRA, at 4,
available at http://www.sagaftra.org/files/sag/documents/2011_TV-Theatrical Summary.pdf (last
visited Feb. 8, 2014).
243. See TV Performers Again Take Hit from Reality Programming, SAG-AFTRA (Oct. 5,
2005), http://www.sagaftra.org/content/tv-performers-again-take-hit-from-reality-programming.
2015 WHITE MEN STILL DOMINATE REALITY TELEVISION 197
casting practices by offering free membership to first-time reality show
applicants for a limited amount of time-for example, three months or six
months, or until they obtain a role on a union-covered program, whichever
is shorter.2 44 As a condition to joining under the "free trial" program, the
union could require the Union Information trial members to pay certain
dues in the future if they are successful. After all, increasing membership
is likely in the union's best interest.
A free membership incentive for applicants could, with enough
resulting membership, eventually force producers to register reality
programs with SAG-AFTRA and begin hiring members for reality
television. And as long as SAG-AFTRA includes reality show applicants
as "employees" under its collective bargaining agreements with reality
television producers, those employees will be protected under the SAG-
AFTRA's non-discrimination policy.
Alternatively, SAG-AFTRA can negotiate with producers to include a
provision that they must register a reality program if they were to hire any
member media professionals, including producers themselves, cameramen,
extras, makeup artist, photographers, network employees, or the host of the
program. Either way, SAG-AFTRA needs to broaden its protections
against discrimination to include everyone working in television if it wants
to meaningfully carry out its stated goals. Thus, collective bargaining
protection may be an avenue for promoting diversity and inclusion in
casting decisions.
2. Industry Initiative in Response to Public Opinion
In January 2014, ABC took a cue from the Claybrooks lawsuit and
featured the first ethnic Bachelor, Juan Pablo Galavis, in the show's
eighteenth season.2 4 5  ABC boasted its first non-white Bachelor in the
show's headlines: "The Bachelor returns with its first Latino," "[h]ola, Juan
Pablo," "[e]xpect 'lots of Latino' fun." 2 4 6 But ABC's efforts were met with
criticisms that Galavis "looks so white he could easily slip into a Mitt
Romney family photo,"247 and that ABC should "[g]ive the viewers a
244. This type of free membership would be comparable to affirmative action in hiring
practices.
245. Cindy Y. Rodriguez, Does Hollywood Have a Latino Problem?, CNN (updated Jan. 21,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/17/showbiz/latino-stereotypes/; see also Allison P. Davis,
Juan Pablo Is the Worst Bachelor in History, THECUT.COM, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/03/juan-pablo-is-the-worst-bachelor-in-history.html (quotation
marks omitted) (stating that Juan Pablo Galavis is the show's first minority).
246. Rodriguez, supra note 245 (quotation marks in original).
247. Dana Schuster, ABC Calls White, Latin Man Its First 'Non-Caucasian'-'Bachelor',
N.Y. POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/08/07/abc-calls-white-latin-man-its-first-non-
caucasian-bachelor/.
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difference they can see."248 Despite ABC's showcasing, Galavis perhaps
only confirmed the producers' reluctance to cast a person of color for the
lead role.24 9
Similarly, as soon as HBO's new series Girls premiered in April 2012,
its viewers criticized the show for the lack of racial diversity in the cast.25 0
Critics questioned how the four white female friends on the show could
only have white friends, and "chastised Hollywood for perpetuating the
fiction of such extreme levels of racial separation in personal and romantic
relationships." 25 1 The show's creator, writer and lead actress, Lena
Dunham, promised to change the show's racial makeup if the show were
renewed for a second season.252 And, as promised, the second season
featured African-American actor Donald Glover.253 This type of real
change, even if it only added one person of color to every television
program, has to occur.
Thus, although it may not be pleasant to admit, perhaps the first step in
promoting diversity and inclusion in casting decisions can and should come
from viewers. As Girls example demonstrates, viewers can effectively
promote diverse casting by shaping public dialogue. This sort of industry
"self-regulation" methodology would also avoid costly litigation.
V. Conclusion
Although reality television has gained significant popularity in recent
years, legal scholars have not paid enough attention to protect equal
employment rights in the reality television industry. Given the highly
selective nature of the industry's casting practices, finding the
discriminatory motive is extremely difficult. Additionally, the lack of
precedent challenging a discriminatory casting decision makes it even more
difficult for individuals who have suffered discrimination to bring claims
against producers. With the increasing popularity of reality shows and
almost no legal protections afforded to ordinary people working on the
shows, it is imperative that the law looks critically to discriminatory casting
decisions. More importantly, the law of a multicultural society cannot turn
a blind eye on racial segregation that denies minorities equal opportunities
and equal rights in the entertainment industry.
248. Rodriguez, supra note 245.
249. See Schuster, supra note 247.
250. Noliwe M. Rooks, Why Do We Care More About Diversity on TV Than In Our
Schools?, TIME (May 24, 2012), available at http://ideas.time.com/2012/05/24/why-do-we-care-
more-about-diversity-on-tv-than-in-our-schools/.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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While federal and state antidiscrimination laws are supposed to provide
redress to minorities who have been wrongfully denied employment, no
case law clearly supports minorities working on reality television.
Moreover, interest in protecting free speech rights trump any interest in
promoting diversity. People who have been wrongfully denied
employment also do not likely know that Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or
state civil rights statutes may provide redress. To the extent that the Title
VII approach does not adequately address the reality television industry's
constitutional concerns, perhaps the producers should self-impose non-
legal solutions to protect equal employment rights that are as important as
the industry's free speech rights.
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